revert to baseline with time or when feedback is removed (Joiner and Smith, 2008 ; 1 Kitago et al., 2013) , leaving savings as the most reliable sign of long-term memory 2 for prior adaptation. A number of recent studies have shown that savings is not 3 attributable to faster implicit recalibration (as suggested by (Herzfeld et al., 2014) ), 4 but is instead solely attributable to more effective deliberate re-aiming (Hadjiosif 5 and Smith, 2013; Haith et al., 2015; Morehead et al., 2015) , likely through retrieval 6 of a previously successful re-aiming strategy (Haith and Krakauer, 2014 ; Huberdeau 7 et al., 2015b). These results suggest, puzzlingly, that long-term memory for 8 adaptation is represented as a memory that must be expressed deliberately, rather 9 than as a motor memory, which we would expect to be expressed automatically. 10 11 This conclusion that savings is deliberate seems incongruent with everyday 12 experience acting under perturbed mappings (e.g. wearing eye-glasses), and also 13 with classical observations that people can readily switch between different 14 perturbation environments given enough experience (Martin et al., 1996a; Welch et 15 al., 1993) . It seems implausible that the ability to perform under such conditions 16 could remain purely deliberate. A critical difference in these cases from those in 17 which savings has been shown to be deliberate (Haith et 
12
One problem with comparing learning across trial types within a fixed window of 13 trials is that Aftereffect trials consistently occurred later in the block than the 14 equivalent Short-PT trials. Thus, more learning was likely to have accrued prior to 15 each Aftereffect trial than the other trial types, potentially masking a difference in 16 behavior in these trials. We therefore conducted a finer-grained analysis that 17 compared reach direction for each Short-PT or Aftereffect trial to the average reach 18 direction for each of the two nearest-neighbor Long-PT trials (though excluding 19 trials immediately following an Aftereffect trial; see below for justification as to 20 why). This comparison reconfirmed the effect of limiting preparation time on extent 1 of overall compensation (Short-PT vs Long-PT trials; t = 4.49, p < 0.001), and also 2 revealed a significant difference in behavior between Aftereffect trials and regular, 3
Long-PT trials (Aftereffect trials vs Long-PT trials; t = 5.42, p < 0.001). 4
5
We also examined behavior in each trial type at asymptote (trials 34 -40). Here, 6
there was also a significant difference among the trial types (one-way ANOVA: F(2) 7 = 6.42, p < 0.01), with a significant difference between Long-PT and Aftereffect trials 8 (t = 4.20, p < 0.001) and between Long-PT and Short-PT trials (t = 5.34, p < 0.001), 9
but not between Aftereffect and Short-PT trials ( t = 0.103, p = 0.92). confirming that participants compensated for the perturbation using a combination 17 of deliberate re-aiming and implicit recalibration. 18 
19

Reversion toward baseline following Aftereffect trials 20
We noted that, in Long-PT trials that immediately followed Aftereffect trials, the 21 reach direction was, on average, nearer to baseline compared to the Long-PT trial 22 2015). Adaptation did, however, appear to recover rapidly in the subsequent trials. 5
For this reason, post-Aftereffect trials (which, by design, were always Long-PT 6 trials) were excluded from all analyses. 7 8
Practice enabled savings for opposite rotations 9
During the course of the experiment, the direction of the cursor rotation periodically 10 alternated between "rotation A" (30° or -30°, counterbalanced across participants), 11
to "rotation B" (-30° or 30°), and finally to "null" (0°) (Figure 1c 
7
The rate of implicit recalibration was not altered by practice 8
In order to determine which components of learning supported the savings seen 9 following repeated practice, we re-introduced the probe trials (Aftereffect trials and 10 Short-PT trials) in the final perturbation cycle (Figure 1c ). Despite the strong 11 savings seen in regular, Long-PT trials, performance in Aftereffect trials did not 12 improve during the seventh cycle compared to the first cycle (Figure 3a the seventh cycle (rate: t = 2.84, p < 0.05; asymptote: t = 5.23, p < 0.001). There was 5 also a significant interaction among the three trial types for adaptation rate ( Figure  6 3b; 2-way ANOVA interaction: F(2) = 1.85, p < 0.05). 7
8
In summary, we found that the implicit recalibration did not change despite 9
extensive practice adapting to a perturbation. Practice did, however, lead to a 10 qualitative change in the nature of the memory for adaptation, apparent in the fact 11 that participants were able to express more of their learning when preparation time 12
was limited, suggesting a transition from a computationally expensive deliberate 13 process to one that was automatic. 14 
15
Savings under limited preparation time emerged gradually with practice 16
The results of Experiment 1 suggested that repeated exposure to a perturbation led 17 to a qualitative change in behavior, with faster, more automatic compensation. 18 However, because we only probed during the first and the final cycles, we were 19 unable to determine the time-course over which this change occurred. We therefore 20 Behavior for Short-PT (red) and Aftereffect (green) trials was only measured in Cycles 1 and 7. 
Experimental Setup 7
Participants were seated at a glass-surfaced table with their right forearm 8 supported by a splint that allowed nearly frictionless planar arm movement. 9
Participants' arms were obstructed from their own view by a mirror, on which was 10 projected a display from a downward-facing LCD monitor installed above the mirror 11 (60 Hz refresh rate; LG). take your time / and aim directly for the target". All participants were literate in 8
English. Participants were also verbally instructed at the beginning of each session 9 of the experiment that during these Aftereffect probe trials, no cursor would be 10 visible, no audible tone sequence would sound, no movement initiation time 11 constraints were in place, and they were to reach for the target as if they wanted 12 their finger to intersect with the target. 13 14 A pair of Aftereffect probes, one for each target direction, followed each series of 10 15 Long-or Short-PT trials in blocks when they were present (Figure 1c ). In 16 Experiment 1, Aftereffect probes were included in all blocks for which Short-PT 17 trials were present, except for the initial familiarization block (Figure 1c) . 18 
19
Participants were instructed that for Long-and Short-PT trial types they were to 20 prioritize the timing of their movement initiation. They were instructed to be as 21 accurate as possible in hitting the target with the cursor, and to reach with a 22 consistent, fast speed (between 4.5 cm/s and 13 cm/s). Feedback regarding 23 movement timing and movement speed was provided following every Long-and 1 Short-PT trial through visual displays on the screen (similar to (Haith et al., 2015) ). 
Data analysis 20
All data were analyzed offline in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, MA) and in R (The 21 R Project, www.r-project.org). Kinematic data were smoothed with a 2 nd -order 22
Savitzky-Golay interpolation filter with half width 54 ms. These smoothed signals 23 were then differentiated to obtain velocity. The time of movement initiation was 1 determined by searching from the peak velocity backwards in time to find the last 2 time at which tangential velocity exceeded a threshold of 2 cm/s. Reach direction 3 was determined by computing the angle of the instantaneous velocity at 100 ms 4 after movement onset. Trials during which participants either failed to reach or 5 abruptly altered their initial reach direction after having reached 2 cm from the 6 start position were excluded from analysis (on average, 5 trials were excluded per 7 participant for this reason). This type of error was most likely to have occurred 8 during Short-PT trials, due to participants initially moving towards the original 9 target location. Participants were excluded from further analysis if fewer than 50% 10 of their Short-PT trials were directed towards the correct target. 11
12
The initial learning rate during a given rotation cycle was quantified as the average 13 compensation over the first few trials of that cycle. Following a similar approach as 14 in (Haith et al., 2015) , we assessed initial learning during Long-PT trials based on 15 the mean reach direction over the initial eight Long-PT trials, though we exclude the 16 first trial following rotation onset and any post-Aftereffect trials from this average. 17
For Short-PT trials and Aftereffect probes, the average reach direction in the initial 18 two trials of each type following rotation onset was taken as the initial learning 19 measure. Similarly, the final eight trials (for Long-PT trials), and final two trials (for 20
Short-PT and Aftereffect trials), in each rotation were averaged and used as a 21 summary measure for asymptotic behavior (excluding post-Aftereffect trials). 22 
23
For Experiment 1, a 2-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was conducted on the 1 early adaptation measure, with trial type (Long PT, Short PT, and Aftereffect) and 2 rotation cycle used as factors. In the event of an interaction between trial type and 3 cycle, t-tests were planned to detect any difference among groups in early learning 4 or asymptote during the first and the final rotation cycles, and to test for savings 5 from the first to the final rotation cycle for each trial type. A linear mixed-effects 6 model analysis was conducted for Experiment 2, using trial type (Long-and Short-7 PT), and cycle (cycles 1 to 6) as fixed effects, and subject as a random factor. 8 9
Discussion 10
Our experiments showed that repeated exposure to a pair of alternating rotations 11 led to a qualitative change in the ability to express memory for adaptation. We 12 measured the extent of implicit recalibration using Aftereffect trials and found, 13 consistent with previous work, that implicit recalibration accounted for only a 14 fraction of overall learning, implying the existence of additional re-aiming processes 15 practice effect was not due to improved implicit recalibration, we conclude that it 7 was attributable to participants becoming able to express their learning more 8 rapidly and automatically. The transition from deliberate to automatic control is more usually established 15 through dual-task paradigms, which allow the reliance on cognitive resources to be 16 measured at different points during learning (Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977) . In 17 addition to a reduction in cognitive load, automaticity has also been characterized in 18 terms of processing speed, and whether or not responses are obligatory (Cohen et 19 al., 1992; Logan, 1980) . These other facets of automatic behavior have been 20 relatively little studied in comparison to effects associated with cognitive load, and 21 it is unclear exactly how these effects of practice are inter-related. We suggest that 22 limiting response times might offer an alternative, perhaps more powerful approach 23 to investigate these effects. Restricting preparation time has been demonstrated to 1 limit deliberative reasoning in more abstract decision-making tasks (Keramati et al., 2 2011 ). We have also recently used a similar approach to establish that learned 3 motor responses become faster and become habitual through practice (Hardwick et 4 al., 2017) . Future work will be necessary to fully understand the relationship 5 between processing time, cognitive load, and whether or not responses are habitual. 6 7
Overcoming interference through automaticity 8
A key difference from our previous work exploring the influence of movement 9 preparation time on the expression of savings (Haith et al., 2015) is in the way we 10 washed out participants' learning in between exposures to the perturbation(s). 11
Previously, we washed out participants by switching off the perturbation for 20 12 trials and allowing participants an overnight break. In this set of experiments, we 13 washed participants out by imposing a counter-perturbation followed by no 14 perturbation. We found this be an effective means of ensuring that behavior 15 returned to a fixed baseline in all trial types, allowing us to directly compare the 16 response to the introduction of the perturbation across cycles. 17 
18
Imposing a counter-perturbation (perturbation B) also created the possibility of 19 interference between memories for the two perturbations (Krakauer et al., 2005) . 20 Indeed, we found that the extent of savings in regular, Long-PT trials was weaker 21 than is typical in adaptation experiments, suggesting partial interference. This 22 interference was fully overcome with practice alternating between different 23 perturbations, as would be expected based on classical experiments on adapting to 1 alternating visual shifts induced by prisms (Martin et al., 1996b drawing, despite having no recollection of ever having done the practiced tasks 17 (Cohen and Squire, 1980; Milner, 1962) . These findings directly gave rise to the 18 deeply embedded notion that motor skills are procedural, and distinct from 19 declarative memory systems (Cohen and Squire, 1980) . How can the H.M. result be 20 reconciled with our model of a transformation from deliberate to automatic control? 21
The answer, we suggest, is that the processes needed for deliberate control are in 22 fact intact in amnesic patients (Schacter et al., 1982; Squire and Zola, 1998; Tulving, 23 1985) , even though the ability to build long-term memories for these processes is 1 impaired. Amnesic patients are unimpaired at most cognitive tasks and basic 2 reasoning abilities (Schacter et al., 1982 (Schacter et al., , 1982 Squire and Zola, 1998; Tulving, 3 1985) , provided the tasks do not require holding specific facts in memory beyond 4 the capacity of their short-term memory. H.M. could have been able to gradually 5 learn new skills by rapidly automatizing fragments of the skill within each session. 6
These automatized fragments could then have been retrieved in subsequent 7 sessions, leaving less work for deliberate control. Iterating this fragmentary 8 automatization and retrieval would ultimately allow a new, deliberate skill to be 9 gradually acquired and retained across sessions, even though the skill initially 10 depended on declarative processes. reconciliation, showing that a compensatory strategy that is initially applied 10 deliberately can be applied automatically following practice. This transition mirrors 11 the transition from declarative to procedural memory that has commonly been 12 invoked in theories of skill learning (Anderson, 1982; Fitts and Posner) . Thus, in a 13 restricted sense, adaptation paradigms do encompass a model of more general skill 14 learning processes. Nevertheless, the presence of implicit recalibration, which 15 appears to be insensitive to practice-related effects, actually significantly 16 complicates behavior in such paradigms. We suggest that skill learning might be 17 better studied in paradigms that more effectively isolate the deliberate-to-automatic 18 transition. 19 20 Thanks to members of the BLAM lab for helpful criticism and discussion. We thank 1 
